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1.　Introduction
Natural resources are one of the top 20 most important determinants of economic growth 
(Sala-i-Martin, 1997).　Through history, it has played an essential role for prosperity in a num-
ber of the countries characterized as developed (Kolstad and Wig, 2009b).　In many export 
concentrated countries, natural resources also cover large proportion of their total exports.　As 
shown in the Table 1, it is clear that, with very few exceptions, countries with the highest export 
concentration scores also have substantial high shares of natural resources in their total exports. 
Folowing Sachs and Warner (1995b, 1997a), the share of natural resources in total exports is 
represented by the share of primary commodities in total exports.
The export concentration indices obtained from United Nations (2009) shows the value 
from 0–1 with values closer to 1 indicating greater concentration of export.　The table shows 
that in Guinea-Bissau and Angola–the respective highest and the second highest export concen-
tration–natural resources play significant roles in their economies indicated by the 99.62% and 
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99.75% share of natural resources in total export, respectively.
Finding from Chambers (2009) shows that an increase of natural-resource utilization wil 
raise the balanced growth path’s output growth rate.　More specificaly, when more natural 
resources are utilized in production within a country, its subsequent 5-year growth rate in output 
wil rise.　However, a sizable body of studies has shown that many resource-rich countries 
have sufered from the curse of natural resources that is natural resources in turn have inverse 
impact on the economic growth.　Most of the recent resource curse literatures are inspired by 
the empirical study of Sachs and Warner (1995b, 1997a) showing the evidence of the so-caled 
Resource Curse.　Evidently, many resource-rich African countries such as Angola, Nigeria, 
Sudan and the Congo continue to experience low per capita income and low quality of life 
while the East Asian economies such as Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan have 
162
Table 1　Export Concentration and Share of Natural Resources in Merchan
dise Exports in 2008
Share of Natural Resources 
in Total Export (%)1)
Export Concentration Index 
(0–1)
99.620.98Guinea-Bissau
99.750.97Angola
96.020.93Venezuela 
98.640.92Azerbaijan
94.290.91Nigeria
99.280.91Sudan
97.620.85Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
96.540.84Gabon
15.080.82Suriname
99.990.82Maldives
95.870.81Turkmenistan
92.820.80Saudi Arabia
14.770.79Samoa
96.920.77Equatorial Guinea
94.140.77Yemen
86.690.76Congo
89.420.76Iran (Islamic Republic of)
94.290.74Mali
Source: United Nations (2009) and author.
1) Calculated by the author using data from United Nations (2009).
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achieved western-level standards of living despite having less exportable natural resources 
(Frankel, 2010).
2.　Economic Growth and Natural Resource
Despite a number of arguments that Dutch disease efects largely explain the growth col-
lapse in resource-abundant economies, Auty (2008) argues that they neglect the importance of 
policy in mediating outcomes.　His subtle explanation is that export base theory shows how 
natural resource booms can also sustain economic diversification.　This theory is developed by 
Innes (1920), North (1955) and Watkins (1963) in order to explain the growth of diversified, 
prosperous, regional economies based upon the export of primary products, rather than upon 
industrialization.　The main concept of the resource-driven development is that the smaler the 
natural resource rent to the GDP and the more difusely it is spread across economic agents, the 
higher probability of engendering a developmental political state that sustains rapid growth in 
per capita GDP which in turn strengthen sanctions against anti-social governance (Auty, 2008).
Various theoretical reasoning and statistical evidence suggest that possession of natural 
resources endowment can confer negative efects on economy (for example, Sachs and Warner, 
1995b, 1997a, 1997c, 2001).　However, Stijns (2005, 2009) assumed that resource abundance 
is likely to afect economy in many diferent ways, which they caled “Channels of Operation”. 
One of them is the efect of natural resources on human capital accumulation.　Stijns (2009) 
shows the positive nexus between the education and subsoil wealth per capita indicated by the 
decrease in both male and female iliteracy when the subsoil wealth per capita distribution is 
moved up quartile by quartile.
Folowing up on the empirical strategy by Brunnschwelie and Bulte (2008) in exploring 
the determinants of resource dependence, Brunnschwelie and Bulte (2009) analyzed the impacts 
of resource dependence as wel as abundance on the prosperity of the onset of conflict by run-
ning three diferent regression equations including a resource dependence equation, an income 
equation, and a conflict regression equation.　They found that resource dependence may be 
influenced by both the biophysical context (resource abundance and geography), and by the 
institutional framework and the policy choices it generates (government system and trade 
openness).　Their specific empirical results demonstrated a (weakly) concave relationship 
between resource dependence and the onset of conflict in the sense that resource dependence ini-
tialy leads to higher probability of conflict, but then decreases the probability.　In other words, 
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their conclusive results are consistent with the view that the resource scarcity–rather than 
resource abundance–may drive conflict.
Lederman and Malony (2007) found that, regard less of the estimation technique, trade 
structure variables are important determinants of economic growth rate.　They found no evi-
dence of resource curse using any of various measures of resource abundance.　They found, in 
the panel context, that natural resources exports enter positively and significantly at the 1% 
level.　They strongly argued the Sachs and Warner (1995b, 1997a)’s assertion that resource 
abundance negatively afects growth.　Similarly, Mehlum et al (2006), Gylfason (2008) and 
Hilbom (2008) found that Botswana, which is the world largest producer of gem diamonds 
(Mahajan, 2009), does not sufer from Dutch disease.　Instead, its per capita GDP based on pur-
chasing power parity had climbed to 13,992 USD in 2009 (IMF, 2010).　The wel-manage-
ment of its diamonds by using the rents to support the economic growth has made Botswana the 
richest country in mainland Africa (World Bank, 2007).
Although some resource-rich countries suffer from negative economic growth (i.e. 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Venezuela), 
Botswana, Ghana and China are the example of resource-rich countries with positive genuine 
saving rates enjoying substantial growth2) (van der Ploeg, 2010).　Conducting a simple fre-
quency count of the pro poorness of 240 growth spels in extractive and non-extractive 
economies, Davis (2009) found that extractive economies have positive growth spels that are 
more frequently pro-poor.
It is interesting that sometimes resource dependence and resource abundance have diferent 
efect on the economic growth.　Some literatures show positive impact of natural resource 
dependence on the growth while natural resource abundance has negative impact (i.e. Arezki 
and van der Ploeg, 2007; Torvik, 2009).　On the other hands, natural resource dependence has 
negative impact on the growth (i.e. Gylfason, 2008) while natural resource abundance has posi-
tive impact (i.e. Brunnschweiler, 2008; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; Gylfason, 2008).　
Gylfason (2008) found that natural capital share representing natural resource abundance statis-
ticaly contributes to economic growth.　Furthermore, using subsoil assets instead of natural 
capital in the regression analysis thus excluding timber resources, non-timber forest resources, 
pastureland, cropland and protected areas from consideration to focus on mineral assets, his find-
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2) Other examples from Auty (2001a) are Australia, Canada, Malaysia and Norway who are the excep-
tions to the resource curse hypothesis, whereas Nigeria and Mexico appear to sufer from the resource 
curse.
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ing showed that the total efect of an increase in the subsoil asset share on growth remains nega-
tive as long as total per capita wealth is below 25,000 USD which is true of 82 among 164 
countries.
3.　Resource Curse
Frankel (2010) considered six channels whereby natural resources might possibly lead to 
poor economic performance as folows:
(1) High commodity price volatility imposes risk and transactions costs.
(2) Specialization in natural resources can be detrimental to growth if it crowds out the 
manufacturing sector that is the locus of positive externalities.
(3) Specificaly, mineral riches can lead to civil war which is certainly an obstacle to 
development.
(4) Endowment of point source commodities3) such as oil and minerals, and some crops 
can lead to poor institutions including chronic power struggles, inequality, coruption, 
class structure, and absence of rule of law and property rights.
(5) The Dutch disease resulting from a commodity boom entails real appreciation of the 
currency and increased government spending both of which expand nontrade goods 
and service sectors such as housing and render uncompetitive non-commodity export 
sectors such as manufacturing.
(6) The Prebisch (1950) hypothesis of long-term trends in world commodity prices 
(however, this channel is counteracted by theoretical arguments for a positive trend, 
and empirical findings that there is no consistence either way).
Beginning with Sachs and Warner (1995b), a number of recent works have shown a 
broadly similar conclusion about the inverse impact of natural resource on economic 
performance.　Economists have noticed that many countries have a wealth of natural resources 
are also ful of very poor people (Wenar, 2008).　During the last 50 years, instead of the pros-
perous growth, it appears that there are a number of countries rich in resources such as diamond 
or oil do worse in terms of economic development or growth leading to the term of resource 
curse by Sachs and Warner (1995b).　The best known formal empirical tests for the resource 
curse, among others, are found in the works of Sachs and Warner (1995b, 1997a, 1997b, 1999, 
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3) Point source resources are those where ownership is concentrated and exploitation is capital intensive.　
They are typicaly oil and minerals, but also plantation-grown agricultural crops (Stevens, 2008).
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2001) employing natural resource exporters as a share of GDP as their proxy, they persistently 
found a negative correlation between natural resource and economic growth.　According to 
Aldave and García-Peñalosa (2009), the empirical literature has identified three factors that 
seem to be most systemicaly correlated with poor economic performance: low educational 
atainment in the population, widespread coruption and abundant natural resources.
A large body of empirical evidence demonstrates an inverse relationship between natural 
resource endowments and economic growth, even when controling for a variety of variables 
(Bulte and Damania, 2008).　It has been widely held that countries specializing in natural 
resource extraction have sufered from the so-caled: “resource curse” (see Davis and Tilton, 
2005; Stevens, 2005; Davis and Cordano, 2008).　The resource curse seems to be particularly 
more related to point resources such as minerals and petroleum, rather than difuse resources 
such as land (Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Auty, 2001b; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003; 
Isham et al, 2004, 2005; Kolstad et al, 2009; van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009).　The 
resource curse is also wel-known as the paradox of plenty referring to the paradox that coun-
tries or regions rich in natural resources, specificaly point-source nonrenewable resources like 
minerals and fuels, tend to have less economic growth and worse development outcomes than 
countries with fewer natural resource endowments.　This paradox is due to several reasons 
including a decline in the competitiveness of other economic sector caused by appreciation of 
the real exchange rate, volatility of revenues from the natural resource sector due to exposure to 
global commodity market swings, government mismanagement of resources or inefectual insti-
tutions (Wikipedia, 2010).
According to Pegg (2010), despite a number of sources, at least five diferent dimensions 
are highlighted in the resource curse literature.　First, resource-abundant countries are aleged 
to not invest adequately in education (Gylfason, 2001 chalenged by Stijins, 2006).　Second, 
resource abundant countries are subject to increase risks for civil war (Colier and Heofler, 
1998, 2000, 2004, 2005; Ross, 2004).　Third, resource-abundant countries have dificulties in 
establishing or consolidating democratic forms of governance (Ross, 2001a; Jensen and 
Wantchekon, 2004).　Fourth, it is believed that resource abundance leads to the risk of 
increased corruption and have corrosive efects on the quality of institutions (Ades and Di, 
1999; Leite and Weidmann, 1999 partialy chalenged by Petermann et al, 2007; Mehlum et al, 
2008; Bulte and Damania, 2008; Kolstad and Wig, 2009b).　And fifth, oil and mineral-abun-
dant states are seen acceptable to the Dutch disease and other ailments which finaly lead to 
slow or negative growth (Sachs and Warner, 1995b; 2001 chalenged by Davis, 1995 and 
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Stijins, 2005).
A number of paradoxical finding of a negative relationship between a sizable resource sec-
tor and economic growth has atracted atention from academics, policy-makers as wel as inter-
national organizations (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008).　A sizable body of literature show 
the negative impact of the natural resource on the economic growth (i.e. Barro, 1991; DeLong 
and Summers, 1991; Mankiw et al, 1992; King and Levine, 1993; Sala-i-Martin, 1997; 
Rodriguez and Sachs, 1999; Sachs and Warner, 1995a, 1995b, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1999, 
2001, Boschini et al, 2003; Gylfason and Zoega, 2006; van der Ploeg, 2006; Arezki and van der 
Ploeg, 2007; Gylfason, 2008; Mehlum et al, 2008 ; Torvik, 2009).　Assuming that the share of 
primary product exports in GDP is a suitable proxy for resource wealth, it has been shown that 
many countries that are wel-endowed with natural resources are likely to grow slower than 
their resource-poor counterparts (i.e. Sachs and Warner, 1995b, 1997a, 2001; Auty, 2001a).
According to Gylfason (2008), natural resources are a fixed factor of production that 
impedes potential economic growth, causing a growing population and a growing stock of capi-
tal to run into diminishing returns.　The Figure 1 shows the relationship between the share of 
natural capital in total wealth used as a proxy for natural resource dependence and average 
annual per capita GDP growth of 164 resource-rich countries in 1960–2000.　Gylfason found 
the expected relationship that a decrease in the natural capital share by 20 percent of total 
wealth statisticaly corresponds to an increase in per capita GDP growth by 1 percentage point 
per year.
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Source: Calculated by Gylfason (2008) based on data from World Bank 
(2006, 2007).
Figure 1　Economic Growth and Natural Capital 1960–2000
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Gylfason (2008) distinguished total capital or total national wealth into five categories: real 
capital, human capital, social capital, financial capital and natural capital.　Among these kinds 
of capital, natural capital seems diferent in that it tends to unleash forces that may have an 
adverse impact on the accumulation of other kinds of capital.　He also emphasized that no 
country was ever held back by the burden of too much real capital or human capital or social 
capital or financial capital.
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) showed the evidence that between 1965 and 2000, 
Nigeria–Africa’s largest oil exporter–received substantial percentage of its GDP from oil reve-
nues totaled about 350 bilion USD.　In the 30 years after 1970, however, the percentage of 
Nigerians living in extreme poverty (1 USD/day) increased from 36 percent to almost 70 
percent.　According to van der Ploeg (2010), negative genuine saving rates of many resource-
rich countries are often judged to be detrimental to their economic performance.　There may 
also be political economy reasons for negative genuine saving (which leads to negative growth) 
to do with institutions, coruption, and badly functional market.
Due to the atractiveness of high profitability in the natural resources extraction, the eco-
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Source: Gylfason (2008).
Figure 2　Diferent Kinds of Capital and Growth
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nomic diversification may be neglected or delayed by the authorities.　Even the authorities try 
to diversify the economy, this is made dificult since the resource extractive operation is vastly 
more lucrative and out-competes other industry.　In economics, Dutch disease is a concept that 
purportedly explains the apparent relationship between the increase in exploitation of natural 
resources and a decline in the manufacturing sector.　It refers to a situation where an increase 
in commodity price (such as oil price) increases real wages and appreciates the real exchange 
rate which in turn lowers competitiveness and production of the non-resource exports 
(manufacturing) sector (van Wijnbergen, 1984; Matsuyama, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1995b, 
1997a, 1999, 2001; Torvik, 2001).　Natural capital tends to crowd out foreign capital by reduc-
ing the demand for foreign exchange, contribute to an overvaluation of the currency of the 
home country (Gylfason, 2008).　The example of the phenomenon from Arezki and Ismail 
(2010) is the appreciation of the real exchange rates of Nigeria and Venezuela over the period 
1992 to 2009 when the oil export unit value increases.　According to Corden and Neary (1982, 
pp. 827), the Dutch disease operates through two distinct channels: the resource movement 
efect and the spending efect.　The resource movement efect refers to the shift in production 
towards the natural resources sector.　For example (in WTO, 2010) in an economy with three 
sectors: natural resources, manufacturing and a sector producing non-traded goods, the booming 
natural resources sector wil take factor inputs (including labor) away from the rest of the 
economy.　This leads to an exceed demand for non-traded goods, thus the increase in price of 
non-traded goods.　The spending efect refers to the fact that additional spending caused by the 
increase in natural resources results in a further appreciation of the real exchange rate.　In other 
words, the extra revenues originating from the resource exports boom raise domestic incomes as 
wel as internal demand for al goods.　Since the price of tradable goods is set on world mar-
ket, the additional spending boosts the relative price of non-tradable goods resulting in a further 
appreciation of the real exchange rate (WTO, 2010).
Despite a large number of positive or negative impacts of natural resources on economic 
growth, some literatures found neither negative nor positive impact of the natural resource on 
the economic growth (i.e. Ding and Field, 2005).
4.　Solution of the Resource Curse
A substantial body of studies suggest that, depending on the level of institutions of countri-
es, countries with bad institutions of democratic accountability and the rule of law sufer a nega-
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tive impact of natural resources whereas counties with good institutions do not (i.e. Mehlum et 
al, 2008; Bulte and Damania, 2008; Colier and Goderis, 2009).　Mehlum et al (2008) have 
argued that poor institutions cannot prevent rent-seeking activity that can ofset the gain from 
natural resource abundance.　Rent-seeking reduces the net increase in income for the society 
(Kolstad et al, 2009).　Institution is a key to avoiding rent-seeking by increasing the relative 
profitability of entrepreneurs’ productive options (Mehlum et al, 2008).　Stevens (2008) com-
mented that in countries where institutions are good, politicians are less able to use patronage to 
influence election outcomes.　On the other hands, in countries where institutions are bad per-
verse political incentives wil dominates, and these wil have negative impacts on the economy.　
The recommendation to solve the negative outcome is therefore the policy improvement.　He 
suggested that countries should improve the quality of their institutions to undermine the nega-
tive political-economic impact that natural resource exploitation wil otherwise have.
According to Kolstad and Wig (2009b), for years, the observation that institutions need to 
be improved to address the resource curse has been interpreted as a need to improve formal insti-
tutions through technical means such as rewriting the petroleum law or recognizing 
bureaucracies.　Likewise, the advice from Norman (2009) is that taking care to support the 
development of rule of law in resource-rich developing countries may be of particular 
importance.
Karabegović (2009) commented that nations with sound economic institutions are more 
capable of managing the revenue from natural resources and forming it into positive impact on 
the economic growth.　In addition, sound economic institutions also increase eficiency by 
eliminating barriers to entrepreneurial activity and establishing a rule of law, which is crucial 
for economic activity.　Such institutions, she added, mitigate the curse by reducing incentives 
for rent-seeking and corruption.　This is consistent with the recommendation that addressing 
coruption is essential in helping resource-rich developing countries escape the detriment of the 
resource curse (Kolstad and Søreide, 2008).
A commonality of centralized and decentralized political economy models of the resource 
curse is that resource rents create dysfunctional behavior (rent-seeking of patronage) when insti-
tutions are poor which decreases alocative eficiency in the country (Kolstad and Wig, 2009b). 
Using two types of model namely the rent-seeking model of Mehlum et al (2008) emphasizing 
the importance of institutions of private sector eficiency (i.e. the rule of law, bureaucratic efi-
ciency, the risk of expropriation and reputation of contracts) and the patronage model of 
Robinson et al (2006) stressing the institutions of public sector accountability, Kolstad (2009) 
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found that countries with beter private sector institutions (rule of law) sufer less from the 
resource curse.　Dropping the rule of law index and its interaction with natural resource abun-
dance and includes the democracy index and its interaction, it supports the patronage model of 
Robinson et al (2006) that beter public sector institutions (more accountable government) 
appears to ameliorate the resource curse.　However, the adjusted R2 value decreases into 0.69 
suggesting reduced fit.　Adding both institutional indices and their interaction terms, and test-
ing the hypothesis simultaneously, Kolstad (2009) found that only the rule of law interaction 
term is statisticaly significant.　In other words, when controling for the impact of private sec-
tor institutions, public sector institutions have no additional explanatory power.　Therefore, his 
final result concludes that only private sector institutions are important in avoiding the resource 
curse.　His suggestion is that policy makers and donors in poor resource-rich institutions 
should prioritize the development of institutions governing the private sector.
Like stamping out of corruption, increased democracy can be viewed as an investment in 
social capital (Gylfason, 2008).　Empirical findings of Bhatacharyya and Hodler (2010) sup-
port their theoretical prediction that natural resources foster coruption in resource-rich countries 
with poor democratic institutions.　They also suggested that natural resources may tend to 
reduce the corruption in strong democracies.　In terms of political regimes, Lujala (2009) 
showed that democratic countries are likely to experience less devastating conflicts in the 
resource-rich economies.
Since coruption is detrimental on growth, it is essential to reduce the possibility of corup-
tion in order to escape from the curse in the resource-rich countries.　According to Kolstad and 
Wig (2009a), lack of transparency can exacerbate corruption-related problems; transparency, 
therefore, has been viewed as central to curbing corruption (see also Stiglitz, 2003) and other 
dysfunctions in natural resource-rich countries.　They pointed out that transparence has indirect 
impact on moral costs through its efect on social norms.　In sum, they concluded that transpar-
ency is likely to reduce the corrupt behavior in the resource-rich economies.　They also 
showed that transparency play the role in reducing the possibility of rent-seeking activities and 
increasing the accountability of the government.　In addition, information is also a key factor 
in facilitating and sustaining cooperative behavior which reduce the possibility of coruption.
Gylfason (2008) suggested that since restriction against foreign trade and direct investment 
exacerbates the Dutch disease, trade liberalization would help reduce the extent of the overvalua-
tion and relieve the symptom of Dutch disease.　Gylfason (2008) also pointed out that both eco-
nomic and political diversifications are good for growth because economic diversification 
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directs economic activity away from excessive reliance on primary production in agriculture or 
a few natural-resource-based industries thus facilitating the transfer of labor from low-paying 
occupations in low-skil-intensive farming or mining to more lucrative occupations in more 
high-skil-intensive jobs in manufacturing and services where  political diversification stimu-
lates growth by redistributing political power from ruling elites to the people, thus, in many 
cases, replacing an extended monopoly of often il-goten power by democracy and pluralism.　
Gylfason also suggested that resource-rich economies especialy need diversification, because 
these countries often face jeopardy–that is, natural resource wealth that is concentrated in the 
hands of relatively smal groups that seek to preserve their own privileges by standing in the 
way of both economic and political diversification that would disperse their power and wealth.
5.　Natural Resources Externalities
Natural resources not only have direct impact on the economy, they also have indirect 
impact via their efect on corruption (i.e. Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Kronenberg, 2004; Bulte 
and Damania, 2008; Kolstad and Wig, 2009a), education (i.e. Kronenberg, 2004; Gylfason, 
2001, 2008), civil war (Colier, 2000; Colier and Hoefler, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2005), democ-
racy (i.e. Ross, 2001a; Gylfason, 2008), rent seeking (i.e. Torvik, 2002; Gylfason, 2008; van der 
Ploeg, 2010) and etc.　Auty (2008) and Colier (2000), for example, argued that the growth col-
lapse that resulted from the cumulative distortion of the economy in resource-rich countries may 
not be the ‘trigger’ of civil strife, but they provide the conditions in which such triggers can eas-
ily emerge.　Colier (2000) also suggested that civil strife has strongly positive link not only 
with primary exports, but also with economic decline (that is growth colapse).
In many resource-rich countries, the competition for rents has fueled war (le Bilon, 2001).　
In extreme cases, struggles over natural resource revenue can spark civil wars that destroy physi-
cal and institutional infrastructure (Gylfason and Zoega, 2006; Mehlum et al, 2006).　Accord-
ing to Brunnchweiler and Bulte (2009) the pioneering empirical contribution based on cross-
section analysis by Colier and Hoefler (1998) found that resource dependence had a significant 
curvilinear efect on the onset and duration of war.　The efect on duration is consistent with 
the findings of Lujala (2009, 2010) that conflicts in which natural resources located are longer 
and more violent than other types of conflict.　Specificaly, Lujala (2010) found that if natural 
resources are located inside the actual conflict zone, the duration of conflict is doubled.　The 
longer duration of conflicts as a result of the exploitation of gems in a conflict zone is positively 
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associated with the large number of combat-related deaths (Lujala, 2009).
A number of literatures point out that natural resources are the cause of conflicts within the 
countries (i.e. Smilie et al, 2000; United Nations, 2001; Auty, 2004; Humphreys (2005); Ross, 
2006; Scholaert and Van der gear, 2009).　The example of an African resource-rich country is 
that the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has become mainly about access, con-
trol and trade of five key mineral resources: coltan, diamonds, copper, cobalt and gold (United 
Nations, 2001).　Scholaert and Van der gear (2009) pointed out that ethnic heterogeneity 
might indeed appear as a curse, since many of the war-torn countries highly depend on the 
exploitation of natural resources, and since this type of activity is characterized by low opportu-
nity cost of fighting.
Many conflicts within societies are often provoked by natural resources (i.e. Colier, 2007; 
Scholaert and van der Gear, 2009) as different factions and groups fight for their share 
(Wikipedia, 2010).　Sometimes, these emerge openly as separatist conflicts in regions where 
the resources are extracted (i.e. in Cabinda province which is an oil-rich area of Angola), but 
the conflicts are often in the hidden form, i.e. fights for access to budgetary alocations between 
diferent ministries (Wikipedia, 2010).
In terms of income inequality, resource abundance exacerbates income inequality between 
the populace and political elite.　Benedikt and Samuel (2009) found that inequality fals, in the 
short run, in response to a resource boom.　They argued that low growth and high inequality in 
the resource-abundant countries is due to their bad economic policies (see also Auty, 2001a, 
2001b).
There is a variety of literatures on the way which institutions mater for growth.　Theory 
suggests that conflict over natural resource can afect human, social, and institutional capital 
(Norman, 2009).　In addition to the direct impact, the natural resources indirectly afect the eco-
nomic growth by afecting the quality of institutions (Ross, 2001b; Acemoglu et al, 2005; Isham 
et al, 2005; Norman, 2009), and that institutions in turn have an impact on economic growth 
(Acemoglu et al, 2005; Isham et al, 2005; Norman, 2009).　Over the last decade, the literature 
on economic growth has identified the critical importance of institutional quality (Karabegović, 
2009).　Since the economic institutions determine how economic inputs–human, physical, and 
natural resource capital–are transformed into economic outputs such as economic growth, they 
are important for the nation’s growth (Sobel, 2008).　Recent research into the natural resource 
has specified institutions as a key variable in determining whether a country sufers from the 
resource curse (Stevens and Dietsche, 2008).　Resource-rich countries with badly defined prop-
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erty rights and rapacious rent-seeking realy are worse of (van der Ploeg, 2010).
According to van der Ploeg (2010), as natural resource revenues and resource rents dwin-
dle away at a faster rate in comparison to homogeneous society, the country ends up with lower 
foreign assets in the long run and a lower level of sustainable consumption.　This often occurs 
especialy large in countries with a large degree of fractionalization, poorly developed property 
rights and not much monopoly power on the market for its natural resources.
It is often expected that resource-rich economies may be more susceptible to corruption 
than others.　This is particularly to occur in the case of point-source natural resources (Auty, 
2001b).　In many developing countries that are rich in natural resources, corruption is a mas-
sive problem explaining why resource-rich countries perform badly in terms of socio-economic 
development (Kolstad and Wig, 2009a).　Countries with a lot of fighting activities caused by 
natural resources are likely to sufer from coruption and erosion of the quality of the legal sys-
tem, which discourages saving and investment in productive capital (Hodler, 2006).　The 
extent of coruption in the resource-rich countries distorts the set of policies chosen by the gov-
ernment, with detrimental efects for the economic performance (Bulte and Damania, 2008).
Possessing natural resources has indirect impact on economic growth (Leite and 
Weidmann, 1999; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003) through increases in rent-seeking 
(Lane and Tornel, 1996; 1999; Baland and Francois, 2000; Torvik, 2002; Hodler, 2006; 
Gylfason, 2008), measured by the level of corruption  (Leite and Weidmann, 1999), and that 
corruption negatively affects the growth (Mauro, 1995; Leite and Weidmann, 1999; 
Kronenberg, 2004; Bulte and Damania, 2008).　Corruption is another key part of the resource 
curse (Kolstad et al, 2009).　Many extractive operations of natural resources are ilegal and 
encouraged by multi-national corporations in colusion with national governments (Ayres, 2004).　
In resource-abundant countries, it is often easier to maintain authority through alocating 
resources to favored constituents than through growth-oriented economic policies.　This politi-
cal coruption is fueled by enormous flows of money from natural resource sector.4)
In many oil-rich countries, corruption issues are the same as those of other developing 
countries, but their incidence and impact maybe heightened by the presence of large resource 
rents (Kolstad et al, 2009).　Using a game-theoretic model, Bhatcharyya and Hodler (2010) 
showed that resource rents increase coruption if and only if the quality of the democratic institu-
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4) Source: www.adelaide.edu.au/cies/0320.pdf;
htp:/english.cpiasia.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1749%3Amalaysia-
catches-the-dutch-disease&Itemid=171
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tions is below a certain threshold level.　To test the prediction, they used a reduced form model 
and panel data from 1980-2004 of 124 countries.　Their findings implied that resource-rich 
countries indeed have a tendency to be corrupt (unless the democratic institutions are sufi-
ciently sound) since resource windfals encourage their government to engage in rent-seeking.　
But in the case of Australia and Norway, this tendency can be checked by sound democratic 
institutions that keep governments accountable to the people.　Rapacious rent-seeking rather 
than anticipation of beter times may be one important reason why many natural resource-rich 
countries face disastrous economic and social outcomes (van der Ploeg, 2010).　The more 
agents are involved in rent-seeking, the more income is reduced (Kolstad et al, 2009).　In 
resource-rich countries, rent-seeking domestic producers often demand protection against for-
eign competition, for instance, in the form of restrictions against foreign direct investment and 
trade, exacerbating the Dutch disease that manifests itself through reduced incentives to produce 
non-primary goods and services for export which the overvalued currency renders uncompeti-
tive at world market prices, reducing trade (Gylfason, 2008).　Extensive rent-seeking can breed 
corruption in business and government, thus distorting the alocation of natural resources and 
reducing both social equality and economic eficiency (Gylfason, 2008).
Some of the most resource-rich economies in the world are also among the least demo-
cratic and least egalitarian (Gylfason, 2008).　Resource rents can either enhance or undermine 
the contribution of democracy to growth (Colier and Hoefler, 2009).　Some studies found that 
natural resources impede democracy as found, for example, by Ross (2001); Gylfason (2008), 
for the negative efect of oil on democracy; that is countries that have high revenues from oil 
are less democracy.
The result estimated by Gylfason (2008) as ilustrated in the Figure 3 shows that democ-
racy as a representative of social capital varies inversely with the natural capital share across 
countries.　The slope of the regression line through the scater suggests that a decrease in natu-
ral capital share by 20 percentage point (i.e. from 40 percent of total wealth to 20 percent) goes 
along with more than three-point increase in the democracy index.　The figure shows that liber-
alization from excessive reliance on natural resources goes along with increased freedom from 
dependence on narrow political elites and vice versa.　In other words, natural capital tends to 
crowd out social capital and vice versa.　This is consistent with the finding of Ross (2001a) 
that oil wealth is inversely related to democracy.　When democracy is endogenous variable, 
Gylfason (2008) found that resource dependence weakens democracy while resource abundance 
strengthens.
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Bulte and Damania (2008) suggested that the main efect of resource abundance on eco-
nomic growth occurs through interaction with political variables.　Depending on the type of 
political regime, they demonstrated that resource endowments alow government to extract 
greater surplus (bribes) by pursuing policies that are detrimental to GDP in autocratic regimes.　
Their study, however, found that the efect is mitigated or even reversed into positive in demo-
cratic systems.　Using a cross-country sample of up to 90 countries from al continents to 
empiricaly investigate whether constitutional features determine how natural resource abun-
dance afects economic growth, Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) found that presidential demo-
cratic regimes sufer from the resource curse whereas parliamentary democratic regimes do not.
In resource-rich countries, Lujala (2009) empiricaly found that gemstone mining and 
hydrocarbon production in the conflict zone have largely positive relationship with the number 
of batle deaths (both more than double the number of batle deaths) whereas hydrocarbon out-
side the conflict zone are significantly associated with a decline in the number of combat deaths. 
A more detailed analysis of Lujala (2009) revealed that conflicts over territory with hydrocar-
bon production are the most sever, with example being the secessionist conflicts in the oil-rich 
Southern Sudan and Niger Delta.5)
Natural resources, not only reduce growth through Dutch disease, rent-seeking, corruption 
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5) According to Lujala (2009), The second Sudanese Civil War from 1983–2004 accumulated more than 
55,000 batle deaths, whereas the Nigerian Civil War (the Biafran War) in 1960s kiled more than 
70,000 in combat deaths in just four years.
Source: Calculated by Gylfason (2008) based on data from Polity IV data-
base and World Bank (2006).
Figure 3　Democracy and Natural Capital
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and overconfidence, but also have negative impact on human resources.　In many countries, 
natural resource industries tend to pay far higher salaries than what would be available else-
where in the economy atracting the best talent from both private and government sectors 
(Wikipedia, 2010).　Hence, a deprivation of their best skiled personnel.　In addition, natural 
resources also lead to the neglect of public and private incentives to accumulate human capital 
(that is education) (Gylfason, 2001, 2008).　There is also evidence from Gylfason (2001) that, 
cross countries, public expenditures on education relative to national income, expected years of 
schooling and school enrolment are al inversely related to natural resource dependence.　The 
regression result by Gylfason (2008) showed that an increase in school life expectancy by three 
years from one place to another goes along with an increase in per capita growth by more than 
one percentage point indicating the important of education on growth and vice versa (Bils and 
Klenow, 2000).　When education is treated as endogenous, Gylfason (2008) found that 
resource dependence hurts education while resource abundance helps.6)
According to Gylfason (2008), natural capital tends to crowd out human capital as wel by 
weakening public and private incentives to promote education.　Except for Botswana where 
government expenditure on education relative to income is among the highest in the world, 
Gylfason showed the inverse relationship between school life expectancy and natural resource 
dependence as proxied by the share of natural capital in total wealth of 164 resource-rich 
177
6) Gylfason (2008) defined resource abundance as the amount of natural capital that a country has at its 
disposal: forests, land, oil fields, mineral deposits, and the like whereas resource dependence is the 
extent to which the nation in question depends on these natural resources for its livelihood.
Source: Calculated by Gylfason (2008) based on data from World Bank 
(2007) and UNESCO.
Figure 4　Economic Growth and Education 1960–2000
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countries.
Recent work by Bulte and Damania (2008) which is consistent with the study of Gylfason 
(2008), suggested that resource booms might be logicaly linked to low education through rent-
seeking and corruption.　Besides the efect on education, focusing on the relationship between 
abundance and the institutions that establish or fail to establish the rule of law, Norman (2009) 
found the inverse efect of the mineral abundance (as distinct from a resource extraction inten-
sive economy) on the rule of law which is  an important requirement for growth.　However, 
the robust evidence for direct efect of the mineral abundance on the economic growth was not 
found.
6.　Conclusion
Although some studies showed the importance of natural resources on economic growth, 
most studies in this paper showed that natural resources have a negative impact on the economic 
performance.　It has been shown that many resource-rich countries tend to have slower growth. 
Beginning with Sachs and Warner (1995b), most of recent studies have shown a similar conclu-
sion about the inverse impact of natural resources on economic performance.　This paradox is 
wel-known as a resource curse.　The curse of natural resources is likely to be particularly 
more related in the countries rich in point-resources such as minerals and petroleum rather than 
difuse-resources such as land.　Distinguishing the diference between natural resources abun-
178
Source: Calculated by Gylfason (2008) based on data from UNESCO and 
World Bank (2006).
Figure 5　Education and Natural Capital 2000–2005
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dance and natural resource dependence, Gylfason (2008), for example, showed that the abun-
dance supports the growth while the dependence impedes.　Not only the direct impact, natural 
resources also have indirect impact on the economy through civil war, income inequality, rent-
seeking, coruption, education, democracy and etc.
Most of the suggestions to avoid the curse are to improve the quality of institutions to 
undermine the inverse impact of natural resources on the economy.　Countries with sound eco-
nomic institutions are more capable of managing the revenue from natural resources and form-
ing it into positive impact on the growth.　Sound institutions mitigate the curse by reducing 
incentives for rent-seeking and corruption which are detrimental on growth.　Trade liberaliza-
tion also helps reduce the extent of the overvaluation and relieve the symptom of Dutch disease.
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